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SUMMARYMEASURES AND TYPES
OF ERROR
AVERAGE ERRORS OF ANNUAL FORECASTS
OF GNP AND INDUSTRIAL PRODUCTION
The over-all averages in Tables 1 and 2 indicate that the errors
in the annual forecasts of gross national product averaged about $9
to $10 billion disregarding sign. They appear small—about 2 per cent—
compared with the average level of GNP, but they are big enough to
make the difference between a good and a bad business year. The aver-
age year-to-year change in GNP over 1953—63 amounted to approxi-
mately $22 billion. Thus the errors were, in terms of absolute averages,
not quite one-half the size of the errors that would have been produced
by assuming that next year's GNP would be the same as last year's.
On the other hand, it is important to realize that aggregates as com-
prehensive and complex as GNP are beset by conceptual and estimation
difficulties that make their measurement quite difficult and imprecise.
When the series to be predicted is subject to substantial errors of obser-
vation, forecasting becomes particularly hazardous. A mean forecasting
error of $10.0 billion does not appear very large relative to a mean of
$5.5 billion in the revisions of the given series (see the absolute aver-
ages in Table 1, column 13).
In the index of industrial production, short-term fluctuations play
a greater role and trend a lesser one than in GNP, which should make
forecasting the index more difficult. On the other hand, revisions are
much less disturbing for industrial production than for GNP. The
relation between the forecasting errors and the variability of the
data is not very different for the two series. The average errors of the
annual forecasts of industrial production varied in the narrow range
of 4 to 5 index points (1947—49 =100).This compares with year-to-year32 Short-TermEconomic Forecasts
changes averaging about 8 to 10 index points, as shown in Table 4
(columns 1 and 2, lines 16—22).
Table 4 collects all the salient statistics for an evaluation of the
average performance of both GNP and industrial production forecasts
in recent years. In order to facilitate comparisons, the measures for
GNP are computed not only in billion dollars but also in index num-
bers (1947—49 =100)to make them dimensionally similar to the figures
for the industrial production index. Comparisons for the same sources
and periods suggest that in most cases predicted changes in industrial
production were somewhat larger than those in GNP, even though the
actual changes were somewhat smaller in the former series (see columns
1 and 2, lines 9—22). The absolute errors tend to be larger for the indus-
trial production forecasts (columnsand 4).
However, comparisons of this sort are difficult and necessarily crude
when limited to absolute error measures. The main impression one
gets here, for example, is that the changes and errors are quite similar
for the two variables when expressed in index numbers with a common
base. This is clearly insufficient, though interesting; it is necessary to
move beyond such impressions, and to this end measures of relative
forecast accuracy will be needed.
Measuring the errors relative to the level of the series, however, is
not a satisfactory solution. Thus, a typical error of 2 per cent may
be viewed as small for a series whose variations average 10 per cent,
but it must be judged large indeed for a series whose variations aver-
age 1 per cent. To anticipate a theme developed later in this study,
measures of relative accuracy should take into account the properties
of the predicted variables which make for differences in the degree
of difficulty that confronts the forecaster. An attempt to develop such
measures will involve comparisons of forecasts with types of extrap-
olation. Meanwhile, there is still much to be learned from the abso-
lute accuracy measures now under consideration.
ERRORS OF LEVELS, CHANGES, AND EASE VALUES
The simplest measure of error is obtained by comparing the predicted
and the actual levels, but it is perhaps more important to compare pre-
dicted and actual changes. The error in the change will be the same
as that in the level when the actual level at the time of the forecast is





















































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































036 Short-Term Economic Forecasts
FORECASTS OF MA-JOR EXPENDITURE COMPONENTS OF GNP
Forecasts of •GNP are frequently built upon forecasts of GNP com-
ponents, which are first derived separately and then combined, with
varying amounts of attention given to their interdependence and con-
sistency. Forecasts of total GNP may benefit from a partial cancellation
of errors in forecasts of the components. This is definitely preferable
to the opposite case of positively correlated and mutually reinforcing
errors, which would make the predictions of GNP worse than those
of its components and possibly invalidate them altogether. But gross
inaccuracies in the component forecasts are, of course, always disturb-
ing, even if these errors happen to be largely compensating. In extreme
cases of this sort, the comprehensive aggregate forecast could be re-
garded as "good for the wrong reasons."
On the other hand, some methods of forecasting are concerned di-
rectly with measures of aggregate economic activity such as GNP,
rather than with any GNP components or sectors of the economy.
Forecasts using money supply, for example, fall into this category,
as do indeed forecasts based on composite evaluation of business
cycle indicators. These methods, therefore, may well yield better fore-
casts for GNP than for the components, which is quite understandable.
Annual forecasts of the major expenditure components of GNP have
been analyzed for the following periods and sets: 1953—63, B and F;
1958—63, A and C.4 Table 5 summarizes the results. It is based on errors
computed by taking differences between the predicted and the actual
percentage changes. The dollar levels of the GNP components differ
drastically; the use of percentage changes enables us to make some corn-
parisons between these variables that could not sensibly be made in
terms of dollar changes.
Looking at the summary measures in Table 5, column 1, one finds
4ForecastsA refer to the last quarter of the next year (at annual rates), not to the
total for the year (except for 1958). They have therefore longer spans than the other
forecasts which are all annual, and are not to be compared with the latter (forecasts
with longer spans tend to have larger errors, see Chapter 5). This obviously does not
affect the comparisons between forecasts for different variables (from any given
source), which are the main concern of the present analysis.
5Usingthe symbols introduced earlier (see footnote 1), the error in predicting per.
centage change in a series from the base period t over the span iis defined as
____
I —A.100,where *denotesa preliminary estimate. \ ttiSummary Measures and Types of Error 35
bythe amount of error in the estimated current position or base of
the forecast.1
Regrettably, the estimated current position (ECP) is not always re-
ported by the forecasters. Where such base estimates are not given
they must be imputed, if the change forecasts are to be analyzed. Our
imputations are based on extrapolative methods; where reported ECP's
are given in some years but not in others, the estimates for the latter
also utilize the information for the former.2 The imputations cannot
be shown to be "wrong" (or "right") but undoubtedly have shortcom-
ings. All that can be claimed is that they seem on the whole reasonable
when compared with the reported. ECP's.
The £CP errors are, of course, typically smaller than the errors in
the forecasts proper. One would expect the present or the recent past
to be better known than the future. Looking at the mean absolute
errors in Table 4, one finds no exceptions to this rule (compare col-
umns 3 and 5). However, the ECP errors are by no means negligible.
They average about one-fourth or one-third of the corresponding
errors of the level forecasts for GNP, and from an eighth to more than
half for industrial production.
The error of each level forecast is the algebraic sum of the ECP
error and the error of the predicted change (see footnote 1). For the
GNP forecasts, errors of base have on the average the same (negative)
signs as the larger errors of the future levels (Table 4, columns 6 and
8). Accordingly, the errors of change tend to be less than the errors of
level (compare columns 3—4and6—7).3 For industrial production,
errors of base and of level often differ in sign, and there is less regu-
larity in the relation between the level and the change forecasts (Table
4, lines 16—22).
1the level error be defined as E+Pt + i —A+ 1'where P, A, and E de-
note the prediction, the actual value, and the error, respectively;tis the current
and (t + 1) the next year. The predicted change is( + 1 + —Awhere
At* is a preliminary estimate of the current position (ECP). The error of the change
forecast is E(t+l) =(t+l)—AA+i,where /lAt+iAt+i —A.The error
of ECP is E At* —A.
It follows directly from these definitions that
E '=P_A*_1A-A'=E'=E (t+1)t+1 t' t+1t't+1t
Hence, if At* =A(the ECP error is zero), then + + —A+ 1E+ .
2For brief descriptions of how the ECP's were computed, see Table ,notec.
S The errors of the annual level forecasts for GNP average $10 billion when taken
without regard to sign; the errors of the corresponding change forecasts average
slightly more than $8 billion, or 18 per cent less (see Tables 1 and 2, line 12, col. 13).TABLE 5
Forecasts of Relative Changes in Major Components of GNP:








Forecast Set B: 1953-63
1.Gross national product 1.88 0.31
2.Personal consumption expenditures 1.25 —0.16
3.Gross private domestic investment 11.69 —2.23
4. Plant and equipment 6.42 —3.51
5. Housing 10.95 —6.83
6.'Total government expenditures 1.99 +0.81
7. Federal 4.29 +0.91
8. State and local 1.46 —1.24
'Forecast Set F: 1953-63
9.Gross national product 144 —0.60
10. Personal consumption expenditures 1.51 —0.70
11.Gross private domestic investment 6.20 1.42
12. Total government expenditures 1.19 +0.42
Forecast Set F: OtherPeriods"
13. Consumer durables 4.44 +2.09
14. Consumer nondurables 1.24 +0.92
15. Consumer services 1.64 —0.88
16.Producers' durables 5.01 —1.79
17. NOnresidential construction 3.00 —1.02
18. Residential nonfarm construction 7.00 —3.83
19. Federal government expenditures 1.37 +0.10
20.State and, local expenditures 1.05 —0.76
Forecast Set A: 195863c
21.Gross national produát 1.79 +0.02
22.Personal consumption expenditures 0.92 +0.05
23. Consumer durables 4.57 +0.67
24.Gross private domestic investment 9.08 +2.45
25. Producers' durable s 5.50 —2.70
26. New construction 3.85 —3.78
27.Total government expenditures 2.73 —0.83












28. Gross national product 1.87 —0.07
29. Personal consumption expenditures • 1.36 —0.25
30.Gross private domestic investment 8.03 + 1.83
31. Plant and equipment 4.72 +0.11
32. Residential construction 6.97 —1.90
33. Total government expenditures 1.44 —1.04
34, Federal 2.92 —0.89
35. State and local 1.90 —1.90
8Based on errors of percentage change as defined in text and footnote 5.
bEntrieson lines 13-15 refer to 1959-63; lines 16, 19, and 20, to 1955-63;
lines 17 and 18, to 1956-63.
CRefer to the last quarter of the next year (at annual rates), not to the
total for the year (except for 1958, which is an annual forecast). See note 4.
that the errors in predicting percentage changes in personal consump-
tion are far smaller than those in forecasts of gross private domestic
investment (GPDI). The errors for total government spending are
moderate: larger than those in consumption but much smaller than
those in investment.
Within aggregate consumption, the errors are much larger for dur-
able goods than for either nondurables or services. Within aggregate
investment, the errors for housing or residential construction are par-
ticularly large: they exceed the errors for plant and equipment (in sets
B and C) and the errors in both producers' durables and nonresidential
construction (in set F). A different breakdown shows the record for
producers' durable equipment to be worse than that for total new
construction (in set A).6
6Takentogether, these results suggest that forecasts of nonresidential construction
must be considerably better than those of producers' durables, offsetting the very
large housing errors. This is actually so in set F for which a construction breakdown
is available (see lines 16—18 in the table).Summary Measures and Types of Error 39
Theseresults agree with what would be generally expected. Spend-
ing for nondurables and services is dominated by stable growth tend-
encies, which lend a measure of stability to over-all consumption,
while outlays for consumer durables are much more volatile. Invest-
ment is, needless to say, much more volatile than consumption. Ex-
penditures on producers' durables have been less stable than construc-
tion in recent times. The more volatile a series, the more difficult is
the prediction of its relative changes and the greater the probable
forecast error.
Expenditures on housing have been restrained during business ex-
pansions by a scarcity of mortgage credit and stimulated during re-
cessions by greater availability of credit. These countercyclical effects
cause spending on residential construction to behave quite differently
from other major expenditure categories. Failure to recognize such
differences may be largely responsible for the particularly bad showing
of the housing forecasts.
The errors in percentage change forecasts for total GNP are, on the
average, much smaller than those for most of the component types of
expenditures. Thus, only consumption and, in some forecasts, total
government or state and local expenditures were predicted as well as,
or better than, total GNP (Table 5, column 1). This indicates that
the aggregation by sectors has, in fact, been associated with a very
substantial cancellation of errors.
Measures of relative change errors need to be supplemented by meas-
ures in dollar terms for two reasons. First, the mean arithmetic errors
of the sectoral forecasts add up to the average error for total GNP,
enabling us to observe the extent to which errors for the different types
of expenditure either cumulate or offset each other and also to com-
pare the corresponding averages without regard to the signs of the
errors. Second, the components of GNP that become negative—net
change in inventories and net foreign investment—can be analyzed
only in absolute, not in relative, terms.
Table 6 summarizes the errors of absolute changes for the two
main sources of sectoral forecasts in our annual data—sets B and F.
The means of these errors, like those in Table 5, column 2, are pre-
dominantly negative (columns 2 and 4), which is typical for predictions
of changes in total GNP as well as industrial production (see Table 4,
col. 7). Only government expenditures and net changes in inventories40 Short-Term Economic Forecasts
TABLE 6
Summary Measures of Error in Two Sets of Forecasts of Absolute
Changes in Major Components of GNP and investment, 1953-63
(billion dollars)













Line or Investment (1) (2) (3) (4)








5.Net change in inventories 2.75 +0.76 2.16c+1.10c
6.Gross private domestic investment 5.86 3.87 —0.60
7.Personal consumption expenditures 379 —0.41 4.16 —1.67
8.Government expenditures 1.76 +0.80 1.06 +0.33
9.Net foreign investment 1.35 —0.29 1.36 —0.37




dSum of lines 1, 3, and 5 does not add to total in line 6 because of rounding.
eSum of lines 6-9 does not add to total in line 10 because of rounding.
have positive mean errors in both sets. The averages for the component
figures are, in general, smaller absolutely than the corresponding fig-
ures for GNP (the investment forecasts in set B provide an exception).
They conceal a greal deal of variation in sign among the errors, as
witnessed by the large differences in absolute size between the paired
entries in columns 1—2 and 3—4 (this cancellation of errors is particu-
larly pronounced in forecasts of set B).
BIAS IN FORECASTING
A set of forecasts is said to contain a bias if it typically understates
or overstates the corresponding actual values. Thus, the criterion ofSummary Measures and Types of Error 41
the absence of bias would be that in the "long run" (that is, for, suffi-
ciently large numbers of comparable forecasts), predictions and realiza-
tions should be on the average equal.7 Actually, strict equality of the
averages cannot be expected in the limited samples that can be ob-
served, and the criterion is to be understood to mean that for unbiased
forecasts the difference between the averages is not significant in the
statistical sense.
To give some examples of biased forecasts, consider a fluctuating
series which rises in good times and falls in bad ones. A strong pessi-
mistic bias would be illustrated by forecasts that consistently specified
lower levels than those observed for that series, which implies pre-
dictions of too small increases and too large decreases. A strong opti-
mistic bias is the reverse: forecasts of higher than the actual levels,
that is, of too large increases and too small decreases.
A simple measure of bias is the mean error, i.e., the difference be-
tween the means of actual and predicted values. Each observed error
can thus be thought to consist of a bias, which is the average error
over the entire period, and the deviation of the observed error from
the average. The bias, therefore, is the constant element in the errors,
since it is the same for each observed error, while the remainder re-
flects the variation among the recorded errors measured from this
average.
A measure of the over-all accuracy of forecasts, which can be con-
veniently used to separate the bias from the remaining error, is the
mean square error M2,computedby squaring the individual forecast
errors and averaging the results. The mean square error is the sum of
two components: the square of the mean error (or bias), and the vari-
ance of the errors.8
The mean square error analysis involves more technical apparatus.
and language than I wish to use in this paper; the interested reader
may consult another report in the National Bureau project on fore-
casting for a further discussion of the statistical concepts just outlined
7 This is just a translation into a less technical language of the standard statistical
definition of bias as the inequality of "expected values."
8 For n time periods (t),
Mp2(Pt—A8)2.E2+ SE2,
where 2=— )2iSthe squared mean error and SE2 is the variance of errors. In
the absence of bias, P =Aand M2 =SE2.42 Short-TermEconomic Forecasts
and a presentation of some corresponding estimates. This section will
merely summarize some of the results of this analysis and rely mainly
on the simpler measures given in the tables of the present report.
The mean errors of the annual forecasts in our collection are given
in Tables 4, 5, and 6 above. They vary greatly in size relative to the
average magnitude of the changes that the forecasters tried to predict
(compare columns 1 and 7 in Table 4) and also relative to the corre-
sponding mean absolute errors. Tests of the statistical significance of
the mean errors are presented elsewhere (see the reference in note 9).
They confirm that the relative importance of bias varies substantially
among forecasts from different sources and for different variables. Thus
the tests give considerable evidence of bias in some of the GNP fore-
casts, but very little indication of significant bias in the industrial pro-
duction forecasts. The differences among forecasters are probably less
meaningful; they cannot be ascribed entirely to the variation in ability
or technique because the periods covered are not identical for all the
sets.1° In general, however, these tests lack conclusiveness, since the
periods covered by our data are short and, hence, the samples of obser-
vations per forecast set are small.
A point of interest in the GNP forecasts is that they generally start
from estimates of current levels that are too low. The mean errors in
these estimates (ECP) are negative for all forecast sets (Table 4, column
8, lines 1—8). This is presumably due in part to the forecasters' reliance
on early figures that are often revised upward during the year to which
the forecasts refer.11 The base values for industrial production, a vari-
able for which such revisions are less frequent and less important, seem
to be in most cases somewhat overestimated (Table 4, column 8, lines
16—22). In any event, the base estimates are often substantially biased
and, consistent with this, the elements of bias tend to be larger in
the level forecasts than in the corresponding change forecasts.
9 Jacob Mincer and Victor Zarnowitz, "The Evaluation of Economic Forecasts"
(forthcoming).
10 For example, the forecast set A for GNP shows a strong bias, with the squared
mean error 2accountingfor approximately 40 per cent of the total M2 (see note
8 for the formula used). But this feature of set A is due mainly to large underesti-
mation errors in the early postwar years (see first section in Chapter 3).
11 Possibly some forecasters are aware of this bias in their estimates and try to
compensate for it implicitly in their change predictions rather than explicitly by
correcting their ECF figures. This assumption would be consistent with one of our
forecast sets, in which the base levels are underestimated but the changes in GNP
are overestimated (Table 4, line 7).Summary Measures and Types of Error 43
Otherstudies have suggested that forecasters generally underestimate
both rises and declines in the predicted series.12 In this case, the. abso-
lute average and the variance of the predicted changes would be
smaller than those of the actual changes, but there need be no bias,
in the specific sense of a significant difference between the arithmetic
averages of predictions and realizations. Indeed, underestimation of
changes would not constitute a systematic error that forecasters could
or should guard against if it were merely the result of forecasters fail-
ing to predict random variations in the actual values. A forecaster
•who ignored only such variations and succeeded in predicting all other
changes would have done as well as could be hoped for, yet his fore-
cast would have a variance smaller than that of the actual values and,
in this sense, would necessarily "underestimate" the observed changes.3
•As this illustrates, it is important to recognize that forecasting errors
which can be traced directly to short random movements must be
regarded as unavoidable. Thus, a sudden outbreak of war or a strike
started without warning are events that an economic forecaster can
hardly be expected to predict (though his job certainly does include
an evaluation of the effects of such events, once known, on the econ-
omy). To put it differently, in principle the requirement of a good
forecast is that it predict well the systematic movements of the given
variable, not that it predict the actual values, since random elements
are virtually always present in economic time series.
Underestimation of changes would have a different meaning if the
changes pertained to longer cyclical movements, not just to short
irregular variations. This result could come about if forecast errors
varied systematically with the values predicted so as to yield under-
estimates at high and overestimates at low levels. Predictions with this
property would have a larger over-all error than predictions which are
independent of levels, hence elimination of this type of systematic
12FrancoModigliani and Owen H. Sauerlander, "Economic Expectations and
Plans of Firms in Relation to Short-Term Forecasting," in Short-Term Economic
Forecasting, Studies in Income and Wealth 17, Princeton for NBER, 1955, Table 8
(based on the Fortune and Dun & Bradstreet Surveys), pp. 288—289; Henri Theil,
Economic Forecasts and Policy, Amsterdam, 1958, Chapters Ill—V.
13Considerthe equation A a + bP + Ut.Unbiased,efficient forecasts require
that a0, b =I,and that u be a random, nonautocorrelated variable with mean
zero. In this case, the variance of A will equal the sum of the variances of P and
of u.44 Short-Term Economic Forecasts
underestimation error must be viewed as desirable.14 But again, errors
of this kind do not necessarily involve a bias, that is, a discrepancy
between long-run averages computed with regard to sign.' This can
be perceived intuitively by visualizing forecasts that result in a series
with cyclical movements around a trend smaller than those actually
recorded, but with a correct estimate of the trend itself. Here, then, is
a type of systematic (and potentially serious) error which is not encom-
passed by the usual statistical definition of bias.16
Have the forecasters represented in our collection tended to under-
estimate changes of either the random or the systematic kind, or both?
The hypothesis that forecasters manage to reproduce the time path of
the predicted series in some smoothed form receives little support from
the materials under review. Actual changes are in fact usually reduced
in the forecasts, but not regularly in both the upward and downward
direction as the hypothesis would imply.' The forecast errors are by
no means limited to the random components of the series, though such
irregular movements doubtless account for a large part of the fore-
14 If P andare correlated, b1 in the relation A =a+ bP + u (in the case
of underestimation of systematic changes, b> 1). The adjusted forecast P =a+ bP
would be an improvement on the original forecast P, whenever the expected values
of a and 1' deviate from zero and unity, respectively. Thus, if b V 1 then the vari-
ance ofis larger than that of Ut (i.e., SES > 52) since 5E2 = +(1 —b)2S2
(where 5,,,2 is the variance of P6).
15 From the formulas for M2 and 5E2 in notes S and 14, it follows that the mean
square error can be decomposed into, three parts:
M2 =E2+ 5E2 =(P—A)2+ (1 —b)S2+
In unbiased forecasts, P2andthe first component of M2 is zero; but the second
component will be positive, unless b =1(it is an increasing function of the devia-
tions of b from zero). It may be noted that this decomposition is equivalent to one of
the two forms introduced in Henri Theil, op. cit., pp. 34—39.
16 One must remember, however, that bias is a possible property of sample esti-
mates referring to some population or aggregate of phenomena to be studied; hence,
what bias is depends on the definition of that aggregate. If a good reason existed
to treat different ranges of the series as belonging to different "populations," then
bias in the strict sense could no longer be excluded in the above situation. For then
the ranges would in effect be viewed as separate variables, and underestimation of
one set of values (say, the high levels) would constitute one case of bias, while
overestimation of the other set (low levels) would constitute another. In each range,
predictions would differ on the average from realizations both for levels and changes.
VT Presumably, smoothing out the irregular movements would work in both
directions alike and not affect systematically the mean of the changes over time (this
assumes that such movements themselves have a zero mean).Summary Measures and Types of Error 45
casters' difficulties.18 As was shown in Chapter 3, forecast errors tend
to differ depending on cyclical phase, with large underestimates being
concentrated mainly in early expansion periods, which are typically
periods of high growth rates.
Actually, it was primarily the increases in GNP that were under.
estimated in the forecasts reviewed, not the decreases (as will be dem-
onstrated in the section that follows). Underestimation of increases
alone would be sufficient to produce the observed result that the pre-
dicted levels of GNP, which is a series with an upward trend, were on the
average too low (note the predominance of negative signs in column 6
of Table 4).19Thesame applies to the finding that, in terms of averages
taken without regard to sign,actual changes exceeded predicted
changes for twelve of the fifteen forecast sets recorded in Table 4 (col-
umns 1—2). It is only when increases and decreases are treated sepa-
rately that one can obtain meaningful indications of a downward bias
in the forecasts—an underestimation of growth.
UNDERESTIMATION OF GROWTH
Forecasters often regard themselves as "conservative" or "cautious." If
this means cautious in appraising growth prospects, the results of our
analysis bear out this view.
Chart 4 presents scatter diagrams for selected sets of annual fore-
casts, which relate the actual to the predicted changes. The chart is
followed by a key, which is self-explanatory.
Because of the prevalence of upward trends in such series as GNP,
personal consumption, and industrial production, the bulk of the ob-
servations in the corresponding scatters fall into the first quadrant
18Theproportion SI/MpI in the GNP and industrial production forecasts (see
note 15 for the underlying decomposition of M2) is very seldom less than 0.5 and
often as high as 0.9 or more (in which case, the other "systematic" components of
M2 are actually unlikely to be significant). However, it should be noted that the
u'sarehere simply the residuals from the regression ofoni.e., that part of
which the "predictor" P, was unable to account for; they need not be in fact
purely random and nonautocorrelated.
19Whenincreases are underestimated, the future levels of the series will also as
a rule be underestimated. (This follows necessarily if the current position is known
or itself understated.) On the other hand, underestimation of decreases would tend
to result in overestimation of levels. Since rises are more frequent than declines in
the series considered here, errors relating to rises, if sufficiently systematic and large,
are likely to dominate the over-all result.CHART 4
Scatter Diagrams of Relations Between Predicted and Actual Changes,
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(where the actual and predicted changes, A and P, are both posi-
tive). That is, few declines occurred in the annual values of GNP and
few were expected, hence there are relatively few points in the other
quadrants. Also, there are often more points above than below the
45° line of perfect forecasts in quadrant I. This means that underesti-
mates of increases are more frequent than overestimates.
Reflecting these characteristics of the scatters, the regression lines
in Chart 4 run, in large part, through the areas of underestimation of
changes.20 This, however, is by no means always true, as illustrated in
the diagrams for forecasts G where the overestimates carry more
weight than the underestimates.
For series that are more volatile, such as the plant and equipment
outlays, the scatters show no distinct concentrations of points in any
single quadrant. Increases are less dominant here and less confidently
predicted. Sometimes declines have been expected instead, giving rise
to turning point errors in quadrant II; at other times, declines have
been correctly predicted (quadrant III). The combination of predicted
rises and actual declines is not recorded in our graph for the plant and
equipment outlays (quadrant IV is empty there) but a few examples
of such turning-point errors are found in other investment forecasts.
As this illustration suggests, forecasts of such variables show little
evidence of biases but also low correlations with the observed changes.
While the results for the different forecast sets vary in several re-
spects, including the significance of the regression estimates, as would
be expected, it is worth noting that in most cases the regressions of
the actual on the predicted changes show positive intercepts and slopes
less than one (see the solid regression lines in Chart 4).
Table 7 summarizes the distributions of errors in the forecasts of
annual changes according to whether they represented overestimates,
underestimates, or turning-point (directional) errors. It confirms that
forecasters frequently underrated the increases in GNP, while dis-
playing no such tendency in regard to decreases.
lEn interpreting this asymmetry, itis necessary to recall that the
recent recessions in the United States have been sufficiently mild and
short to cause only very small declines, or merely retardations of
20Notein particular the diagram for the industrial production forecast E, in
which the scatter and both regression lines clearly indicate a tendency to under.
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TABLE 7
Forecastsof AnnualChanges in Four Comprehensive Aggregates:
Distribution by Type of Change and Type of Error, 1952-63






Under- Over- PointMany Under-
estimatestestimatesCEOrSdestimatese
(2) (3) (4) (5)
Gross National Product(8)f
1.All observations 78 46 25 7 .008
2.Increases 64 43 21 0 .004
3.Decreases 14 3 4 7 .756
Personal Consumption Expenditures (4)f
4.All observations5 39 26 10 3 .006
Gross Private Domestic Investment
(3)f
5.All observations 28 12 12 4 .581
6.Increases 18 8 7 3 .500
7.Decreases 10 4 5 1 .746
Industrial Production(7)f
8.All observations 70 37 26 7 .104
9.Increases 57 28 23 6 .288
10.Decreases 13 9 3 1 .073
alncreases and decreases refer to the direction of changes in the actual values
(first estimates for the given series).
bpredjcted changeis less than actual change A(t+1) <t+j).
CJ)I.edicted change exceeds actual change(P.A(t+l) >.t+iL
dSjP(t+l) '
eBasedon the proportion of all observations •otherthan those with turning-point
errors, accounted for by the underestimates (i.e., col. 2 divided by the difference
between col. 1 and col. 4). Probabilities taken from Harvard Computation Labora-
tory's Tests of the Cumulative Binomial Probability Distribution, Cambridge,
Mass., 1955.
me figure in parentheses is the number of forecast sets covered.
5A11 observed changes are increases.50 Short-Term Economic Forecasts
growth, in the annual values of GNP. According to early estimates, de-
clines occurred in 1953—54 and 1957_58.21Onthe former occasion most
forecasts showed larger declines than actually occurred, and on the
latter most of them missed the downturn. In the years when GNP in-
creased, on the other hand, underestimates were almost twice as fre-
quent as overestimates (see Table 7, lines 2 and 3). In forecasts of per-
sonal consumption expenditures, a series which has risen steadily in
recent years, errors of underestimation also prevail (Table 7, line 4).
In contrast, overestimates are about as frequent as underestimates in
forecasts of gross private investment (lines 5—7). In this series the trend
is much weaker than in the others, and the cyclical and irregular move-
ments are relatively, stronger. Also, for industrial production, a series
with more pronounced fluctuations than those in GNP in current
dollars and with a weaker trend, the forecasts show less tendency to
underestimate increases. On the other hand, the production index
declined much more in recessions than GNP did, and its contractions
were in fact very often understated (Table 7, lines 8—10).
In short, these results suggest that the notion that forecasters tend
to underestimate changes in general—that is, increases as well as de-
creases, short fluctuations as well as longer trends—is a gross oversimpli-
fication. Important asymmetries seem to exist here between errors in
predicting upward and downward changes and also between forecasts
for series with strong growth trends and others.22
Examination of forecasts of other GNP components yields additional
evidence that is consistent with the hypothesis of underestimation of
growth. For all the major expenditure components taken together,
increases were underestimated nearly half the time and overestimated
more than one-third of the time, while turning-point errors account
for the remaining one-sixth of these observations. Decreases were
underestimated about as often as overestimated; they were also, on the
whole, just as frequently missed, but the proportion of these turning-
21 Subsequent revisions converted the declines of GNP in 1953—54 and 1957—58 into
small increases (see Table 2, lines 1—2, columns 2 and 6).
22 The last column of Table 7 lists the probabilities of observing at least as many
underestimates as shown by the forecasts in question. These are derived under cer-
tain highly simplified assumptions which permit application of the binomial dis-
tribution: that tbe forecasts are independent and the chances of under- and over-
estimation are equal in all cases with no turning-point errors. These assumptions
can be questioned and the tests cannot be interpreted in any strict sense, but the
results are suggestive in the context of the preceding observations.Summary Measures and Types of Error 51
point errors varies greatly (set B missed half the declines, set F just one-
sixth).
As this indicates, all types of error are well represented in these fore-
casts, which reflects in part the diverse behavior patterns of the series
concerned. The prevalence of negative signs among the mean errors
(Table 5, col. 2, and Table 6, columns 2 and 4) is due not simply to
underestimation of changes but to a combination of factors: over 70
per cent of the observations relate to increases in the series, where
underestimation is common; and most of the turning-point errors are
negative, being false signals of declines.23
To conclude, asymmetries in the distribution by type of errors asso-
ciated with increases and decreases cast doubt upon the simple hypoth-
esis of general underestimation of changes, but there is considerable
support for the idea that forecasters tend to underrate increases or
growth of comprehensive economic aggregates. As a closely related
point, there is also some direct evidence that underestimation occurs
primarily in certain phases of business cycles, particularly in the early
upswing (see Table 3 and text above). Such patterns probably would
not be observed if this type of error applied merely, or even largely,
to short erratic changes.
TURNING-POINT ERRORS
Many economic time series, and especially those of comprehensive cov-
erage, show strong systematic movements of substantial duration—
trends and specific cycles. They are positively autocorrelated, often
to a high degree. These observations led to the now widely held idea
that it should be rather easy to predict a continuation of the rise or fall
in these series; to forecast correctly the end of the current movement
or phase appears to mark a more meaningful predictive success.
To appraise the performance of forecasts with respect to turning-
point errors, one must compare the signs of predicted and actual
changes. A forecast for any future period is based on the estimate
of the current value of the series, not on the past forecast that has al-
ready been superseded by the intervening information; hence forecasts
28Errorsof change (defined as the forecast minus the actual figure) are negative
when increases are underestimated or decreases are overestimated and when the
predicted change is negative and the actual one is positive. In our samples, the
totals of such cases are typically greater than those of the converse cases in which
the errors of change are positive.52 Short-Term Economic Forecasts
made at successive points of time do not form a continuous series.
Inferences from level forecasts treated as a series can easily be wrong,
particularly on turning-point errors.24
Suppose a series rises, declines, and rises again in three consecutive
years, while forecasts indicate three increases. Looking at the levels,
one may conclude that the forecaster missed two turning points, a peak
and a trough. Looking at the patterns of change, which are +—+for
A and + + + for P,, one finds a single directional error, relating to the
change between years 1 and 2. Actually, only one turning-point error
was made, since the forecaster knew at the end of year 2 that a decline
had taken place and decided that it would be reversed the following
year. In short, to determine whether a turning point has been forecast,
one must compare the forecast change with the preceding actual
change, not with the preceding forecast change.
In evaluating turning-point errors, two questions must be asked: (1)
How often do turning points occur that have not been predicted?
(2) How often do predicted turns actually occur? Accordingly, there
are two basic types of error: missed turns and false signals. In the pre-
ceding paragraph, an example of a missed turn was provided. A false
signal would be given in the case of reversed patterns: + + + for A
and + —+for P.25
In addition to the two types of error, there are two types of correct
forecasts. One is when a turning point (TP) was predicted and it did
24 Consider the following tabulation on the actual (A) and predicted (F) values of
industrial production. It will be noted that the troughs (T) fall in the first half of
1958 for A and in the second half of 1958 for P—an apparent lag of the latter be-
hind the former. But the reversal of sign from minus to plus occurred at the same
time in both the actual and the predicted change, which indicates the absence
of a real lag (the directional change is denoted by *). The important point here is
that such a situation can readily be produced by underestimation of changes
on both sides of the turning point.
Date (t) A (At —A—)P(P —A—
2ndhalf 1957 142
lsthalf 1958 129(T) —13 138 —4
2ndhalf 1958 138 +9 130(T) +1
lstQ 1959 145 +7 143 +5
25 Reversing the order of presentation used above, one can say that type I error
arises when a turning point was predicted but did not occur; type II error, when a
turning point was not predicted but did occur. This parallels the familiar statistical
dichotomy of first-kind and second-kind errors, the former consisting of an incorrect
rejection, the latter of an incorrect acceptance of the null hypothesis (which is here
represented by a forecast of no directional change).Summary Measures and Types of Error 53
occur; the other, when no TP was predicted and none occurred. Thus
there are four basic possibilities which can be arranged in a 2 x2
table as follows. (N refers to the absence, T to the presence of a turning
point. The first letter refers to actual values, the second to forecasts.)
The number of correct forecasts is the sum of the diagonal fre-
quencies: NN + TT. False signals are represented by NT and missed
turns by TN. To compute the proportion of the former, one should
use as a base the number of all predicted turns. This yields the ratio
=NT
.Inthe proportion of missed turns on the other hand NT+ TT
the base is the number of all recorded turns =TN These
TN+ TT
proportions of turning-point errors are analogous to mean errors,
hence the choice of symbols.26
If forecasters relied mainly on trend projections, their record would
be relatively good on false warnings and poor on missed turns.
The tendency for a comprehensive aggregate such as GNP to grow
most of the time is well known to economic observers; hence few re-
versals of direction from one year to another are recorded for this series,
and also few are predicted (note the high proportions of NN in Table
8, column 2). False signals are particularly infrequent. Only two are
listed for the annual GNP predictions, and these refer to the first two
years covered, 1947 and 1948, when an early postwar slump was still
widely anticipated (see column 7, line 1).
For variables with stronger cyclical and irregular components, turn-
ing-point predictions should, and probably will, be more numerous.
Although the chances that a predicted turn will actually occur are
26Assignto each case in the category NT the value land to each case in the
category TT the value 0; the mean of these values is E1 and their variance is
S2r1 =E1(l—ET1).Similarly, assign to each instance of TN the value 1_and to
each instance of TT the_value 0; here the mean of the resulting scores is E2 and















































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































.56 Short-Term Economic Forecasts
greater here, there are likely to be more false warnings as well. This
may help explain the fact that among the annual forecasts of indus-
trial production from the same sources the frequency of false signals
is higher than among the GNP forecasts (column 9, lines 16_17).27
EVALUATINGTHE TURNING-POINT RECORD OF RECENT
AGGREGATIVE FORECASTS
According to Table 8, forecasters of GNP seem to have failed to predict
almost one-half of the turning points that did occur (column 8, line
16). But this hit-and-miss record appears much worse. than it is. All
these errors refer to the 1957—58 decline, which was very small to begin
with in the early annual GNP estimates and was ultimately replaced
by a small increase in the current, revised figures (see Table 8, lines
1—2, column 6). Thus, had we used the current instead of the former
estimates in our error computations, the record of these forecasts
would have been much better on this occasion.
On the other hand, forecasters generally did predict a decline in
GNP in 1954 and, until very recently, data bore them out on this
score.28 However, according to the latest revised figures released in July
1965, there was apparently no decrease in the annual GNP series be-
tween 1953 and 1954 after all, but rather a minuscule increase (see
Table 2, column 2). In this case, then, forecasters were "right" about
the sign of change in this series according to all but the most recent
data. All this illustrates mainly the highly uncertain nature of direc-
tional comparisons when these are applied to a series subject to rela-
tively small short-period changes and revisions large enough to alter
the sign of such changes.
Forecasts of industrial production show only three "misses" on
seventeen occasions (column 5, 1ine 17). This gives a smaller propor-
tion of errors than that shown for GNP; the results here are more
2Z Of the seven errors of this kind for the industrial production forecasts, five refer
to 1961 and one each to 1948 and 1963. In all these cases, declines were predicted
but increases actually occurred.
28 This is shown in Table 2, column 2, where the predicted changes are all nega.
tive and so is the actual change according to the first GNP estimates. Later estimates
whittled down this decline; those available in May 1965, for example, show a change
of —$2.3 billion instead of —$7.7 billion, which is the early figure listed in Table 2,
line 1.Summary Measures and Types of Error 57
valid in the sense that they do not depend on the vintage or revisions
of the data.29
For both GNP and industrial production, all false signals are predic-
tions of peaks (declines) that never materialized; and all missed turns
are peaks, i.e., increases were predicted but declines were posted (at
least according to the early measurements used here). This situation is
also reflected in the distributions of turning-point errors by type of
change in the observed figures, as shown in Table 7 above.80
These results indicate that the main difficulty in predicting reversals
of the economy in the postwar period was with downturns rather than
upturns. This is certainly not surprising. In recent times, business
contractions have been relatively mild and brief and have been widely
expected to be so. They varied much less in duration than expansions
did. It was generally assumed that antirecessionary policies would be
used to attenuate and cut short any declines in aggregate economic
activity. On the other hand, the success of policies designed to steady
and lengthen expansions was probably more difficult to gauge.
Furthermore, recent business cycle peaks have occurred early enough
in the year to be recognized as such by the end of the year, which is
the time when the annual forecasts are made.81 Thus forecasts for
1954, 1958, and 1961 reflected the widespread assumption that the con-
tractions then in process had already run most of their course.82
In short, it is demonstrably quite difficult to appraise annual forecasts
29 Of these three errors, two refer to the late Korean period (1952) when increases
were predicted but declines occurred. One "miss" in the opposite direction is re-
corded for 1958.
30 According to Table 7,column4, all turning-point errors in GNP forecasts since
1952 were associated with declines in GNP. These represent missed peaks. In the
industrial production forecasts, six errors were associated with increases and one
with a decrease; the former are false signals of peaks, the latterisa missed
peak. (Note that Table 7 excludes forecasts made before 1952, which are covered in
Table 8.)
31 According to the National Bureau chronology of business cycle turns, the last
three peaks are dated July 1953, July 1957, and May 1960. The corresponding dates
of specific peaks in GNP (whether measured in current or constant dollars) are II
Q 1953, III Q 1957, and II Q 1960. The downturns in industrial production were
considerably earlier on two occasions (February 1957 and January 1960).
82 This does not imply, however, that the dates of the coming troughs were well
specified in these forecasts; it does not even necessarily mean that the dates of the
troughs were predicted better than those of the peaks. No such inferences can be
made with any assurance from an analysis of annual forecasts; a year is simply too
long a unit period for that.58 Short-Term Economic Forecasts
with respect to their turning-point performance, especially for GNP.
A year is too long a unit period for such an evaluation, since recessions
have been short and mild enough to leave only an uncertain imprint
upon the annual data. Nevertheless, an over-all survey suggests a posi-
tive answer to the question: Were turns predicted more frequently
when observed turns occurred? The evidence lies in the concentration
of the recent forecasts of directional change in the two periods during
which recessions did actually occur (causing at least the early annual
GNP estimates to decline), namely,, in 1953—54 and 1957—58.
While this is believed to be a meaningful result in a practical sense,
its statistical significance cannot be readily established. The double
dichotomy of turning-point forecasts introduced earlier in this dis-
cussion invites the application of the familiar chi-square (x2) test of
independence.33 When the data in Table 8 are pooled for either GNP
or industrial production, high values of x2 are obtained, whose accept-
ance would imply a refutation of the (null) hypothesis that the pre-
dicted turning points are randomly distributed.34 However, such pooi-
ing of the data requires independence among the forecast sets, which
cannot, in general, be assumed. Forecasters presumably influence each
other in various ways and most agree that they do; indeed, the nature
of their environment and efforts is such as to make this just about in-
evitable.
No estimate of the magnitude of these complex effects can be pro-
vided with reasonable assurance. Forecasts of the same series, if they
are any good, must, of course, be positively correlated. In fact, the
correlations among them are typically substantial, as would be ex-
pected: after all, these forecasts all draw in part on the same informa-
33 In our notation, the difference of the cross products in the 2 x 2 table con-
cerned is d =NNx TT —NTx TN. Let the marginal totals be e =NN+ NT,
d2n
1= TN + TT, g =NN+ TN, and h =NT+ TT; then x2
=—--
(wheren =e+
f =g+ h). For small frequencies, the use of a continuous instead of a discontinuous
distribution may considerably understate the probability of obtaining the given re-
suit by chance. An approximate allowance for this can be made by means of the
- (d—n/2)2n Yates correction, which yields2 -SeeR A. Fisher, Statistical Meth-
AS efgh
ods for Research Workers, 12th ed., New York, 1954, Chapter IV.
34 The values of x2 computed from the appropriate entries in lines 16 and 17 of
Table 8 are: for GNP, 28.6;for industrial production, 35.7. The corresponding.
values of x52 are 24.1 and 32.1. The probabilities of obtaining such results by
chance are very small indeed (less than .001).Summary Measures and Types of Error 59
tion and knowledge about the past behavior of the given series and
related variables. This holds even if the forecasters did not influence
each other directly at all. Therefore, the effects of any such influences,
whatever their cause (reputation of some leading experts, pressures to
conform,contagiousexpectations,etc.),would probably beto
strengthen the correlations that already exist. Lacking detailed insight
into each forecaster's procedures, it seems impossible to separate the
effects of the common data from those direct influences that are op-
posed to the hypothesis of forecasters' mutual independence.35
Comparison of forecasts does reveal considerable diversity, however,
suggesting a large role for independent analysis and individual judg.
ment, despite the undoubtedly important common elements (see, e.g.,
Chart 1). Pure imitation must be rare among self-respecting forecasters,
and the observed similarities are usually partial and temporary. Pool-
ing the forecasts from different sources, therefore, will presumably
result in a certain effective increase in the number of independent
observations. But this increase is certainly less than that implied in
the simple sums used in the over-all x2test;hence the latter under-
states, by an unknown quantity, the probability of obtaining .the ob-
served results by chance. Consequently, the results of such tests (see
footnote 34) may at best be suggestive, but cannot be interpreted in any
strict sense.
If the periods covered were longer, so that the numbers of observa-
tions were sufficiently large, the tests of whether predicted turns are
randomly distributed or associated with actual turns could be use-
fully applied to data for each separate forecast set. As it is, however,
the turning-point frequencies for the individual sets included in Table
8 are too small to permit reliable tests of this sort.
35Onemight speculate that common successes are attributable to the use of
similar, valid methods in handling the same data, while common errors are due to
direct influences such as the spread of plausible expectations that proved wrong.
But this need not be so. It is true, of course, that forecasts may share errors as
wellassuccesses; their concordance does not always signify a higher correlation with
the actual outcomes. But it is possible for an analysis recognized as valid and used
independently by many forecasters to lead occasionally to widespread errors; and,
conversely, for an influential individual's view of the future, which was adopted by
many, to prove right.